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Federal Regulation of Tobacco Products and Products 
That Treat Tobacco Dependence: Are the Playing Fields 
Level? 
JosEPH A. PAGE • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Company A is thinking about launching a traditional tobacco product, perhaps a 
cigarette or a smokeless tobacco confection, with a new ingredient, ingredient level, or 
ingredient mix that in the past has never been sold. Company B contemplates putting on 
the market an innovative medication, medical device, or dietary supplement intended to 
help consumers to free themselves from physical dependence on tobacco products. Com-
pany C ponders the possibility of introducing a smoking product whose novelty derives 
from express or implied marketing claims that the product will decrease or perhaps even 
eliminate physical dependence on tobacco, or reduce other risks associated with smok-
ing. What factors will each firm take into account in making the initial decision whether 
or not to go ahead with the new product, in preparing the product for market, in produc-
ing the product, in promoting the product, and in reacting to postmarketing events that 
might affect the product's fate? 
The forces of the marketplace will weigh heavily on each firm's decisionmaking 
process. Companies A, B, and C must calculate how they can best position their products 
vis-a-vis those of their competitors. This will motivate them to reduce costs, improve 
efficiency in production and distribution, lessen risks associated with their products, and 
make them more attractive to consumers. Thus, the marketplace itself may be viewed as 
a playing field on which companies producing similar goods compete for the consumer 
dollar. Ideally, this type of competition will provide the public with the best products at 
the cheapest possible price. 
Unbridled competition, however, has not always accomplished this goal. Manufac-
turers and sellers have resorted at times to a variety of unfair trade practices that give 
them competitive advantages which others in the same field are unable to overcome, and 
which ultimately impose social costs, in the form ofhigher prices or lower-quality prod-
ucts. Moreover, a lack of information occasionally has caused consumers to make deci-
sions, in purchasing and using the product, that cause preventable economic and physical 
harms to themselves or others. Such imperfections in the operation of the free market 
theoretically have justified, and at times have provoked, government intervention. 
One form this intervention has taken is the recognition oflegal remedies for use by 
competitors who have suffered losses as a result of unfair business practices, and by 
consumers and third parties who have incurred injury, illness, or financial disadvantage 
attributable to a product. Such recourse may originate in statutory enactments on the 
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comments made by participants at the Conference; and the research assistance of Steven Mager, Class of 
1998, and Phoebe Mounts, Class of 2000, of the Georgetown University Law Center. Preparation of this 
article has been supported in part by an unrestricted educational grant from SmithKiine Beecham to The 
Food and Drug Law Institute. 
11 
12 Fooo AND DRuG LAw JoURNAL SUPPLEMENT VoL. 53 
federal or state levels,' as well as common-law remedies created by the courts.2 The 
threat oflegalliability is intended to act as a deterrent against conduct that might produce 
unwarranted economic or physical harm. 3 In making the numerous pre- and post-market-
ing decisions associated with a new product, firms such as our hypothetical Companies 
A, B, and C, if they are prudent, will factor the risk of liability into account when they 
make decisions at all stages ofthe life of a product. 
Additionally, there is another type of public intervention with which manufacturers 
have to reckon. The government might decide that neither the market nor private lawsuits 
provide sufficient deterrence or create sufficient incentives. For example, not every con-
sumer or user harmed by a product may be aware that he or she has suffered an injury or 
an illness, or that his or her injury or illness was caused by a product. A manufacturer 
aware of this lack of knowledge could expect a reduced level of exposure to liability, 
which in turn would reduce the manufacturer's incentive to avoid harm and would permit 
the manufacturer to lower prices, which in turn means that an increased number of units 
of an unduly risky product will be sold. Hence, more pervasive regulation might be 
necessary. 
Policymakers hesitant to interfere directly with the functioning of the market might 
opt for indirect forms of regulation that would make it more costly for manufacturers to 
develop and sell their products, or would make it less easy for the public to consume 
them. The power to tax4 and the power to inform5 are obvious tools that government 
might use to decrease consumption of a product, as are regulations limiting the use of a 
product (such as restrictions on smoking6). Conversely, the government might take steps 
to encourage manufacturers to develop products 7 or encourage consumers to use them. 8 
Subsidies to producers might provide incentives for product development, while public-
ity and public education programs might stimulate consumption. 
There also are direct forms that regulation might take, such as ground rules gov-
erning various parts of the production, marketing, and post-marketing processes, es-
tablished either by statute9 or administrative rules promulgated by bodies to whom 
legislatures have delegated authority. 10 Moreover, violations of these ground rules 
1See, e.g., Lanham Trademark Act, Pub. L. No. 79-480, § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427,441 (1946), as amended 
by Pub. L. No. 102-S42, § 3(c), 106 Stat. 3S68 (1992) (codified at IS U.S.C. § 112S(a)(1)(B) (1994)) 
(federal remedy for false advertising and product disparagement available to competitors). For a discussion 
of state laws dealing with unfair or deceptive practices, see generally Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. 
Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade 
Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. S21 (1980). 
2The common law provides remedies for competitors injured by such wrongful practices as the inter-
ference with contractual relations. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 125, at 978 (5th ed. 1984). It also provides a remedy in tort for consumers and others injured by defective, 
unreasonably dangerous products. See id. § 98, at 692. 
'On deterrence and legal liability, see Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: 
Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377 (1994). 
4See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ S701 et seq. (1994) (tax on cigarettes). 
5See, e.g., IS U.S.C. § 1337(a) (Surgeon General directed to report on health consequences of smoking). 
6See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.10S-3(b) (1997) (prohibiting smoking in certain areas of federal buildings). 
'See, e.g., Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. §§ 360aa et seq. (1994) (providing incentives for the development of drugs to treat diseases or 
conditions with small patient populations). 
8See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § IS3 (1994) (providing grants to states that require motorcycle helmets and seat 
belts in the front seats of vehicles). 
9For an example of direct statutory regulation, see the Refrigerator Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 84-930, 70 
Stat. 9S3 (19S6) (codified at IS U.S.C. §§ 1211 et seq.) (illegal to manufacture refrigerators without device 
enabling them to be opened from the inside). 
10 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-S73, 86 Stat. 1207 ( 1972) (codified as amended 
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might result in the imposition of penalties, some of them quite severe.'' A less intru-
sive form of this kind of regulation might be a call for setting performance standards 
but leaving open to the affected parties how these goals will be met. 12 Companies A, 
B, and C will have to pay close attention to both the framework and the details of 
government regulations that directly affect their operations. 
This article will focus on direct government intervention as it might influence the 
decisions that Company A would make in marketing a new tobacco product, and that 
Companies B and C would make in marketing new products intended to help consum-
ers stop using tobacco products or otherwise reduce smoking-related risks. The hid-
den hand of the marketplace will influence these three producers in exactly the same 
way. Likewise, the same liability rules will apply generally to them. Direct govern-
ment regulation, however, tends to be more product-specific, and places different 
burdens on manufacturers and sellers of different products. 13 It also tends to be more 
detailed and hence more intrusive than indirect efforts to influence the conduct of 
manufacturers. 
The harmful effects of products containing tobacco have been known for some 
time. 14 Therefore, one would expect that the government would place severe restric-
tions both on the sale of tobacco products and on the introduction of new or modified 
tobacco products that posed risks long associated with tobacco, and that less strin-
gent restrictions would apply to products intended to reduce or counteract the dam-
age caused to the public health by tobacco. Such a regulatory regime would seem to 
flow inevitably from a dispassionate, reasoned judgment about relative social costs 
and benefits associated with these classes of products. As this article will demon-
strate, however, public policy affecting tobacco products does not seem to reflect this 
kind of calculation. 15 
The regulation of medications such as those under consideration by Company B 
falls within a statutory framework that dates back to 1938, when Congress enacted 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 16 subjecting drugs to a compre-
hensive system of regulation, and to subsequent amendments adopting detailed regu-
latory schemes for medical devices 17 and dietary supplements. 18 On other hand, tradi-
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081) (delegation of broad authority to the Consumer Product Safety Commission to 
regulate consumer products). 
11 Some state statutes authorize the dissolution of a corporation that has engaged in repeated unfair 
trade practices. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. chs. 501.204(1), 501.207(3) (1993). 
12 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a)(1) (mandate under Consumer Product Safety Act that standards be set 
in terms of performance requirements). 
13 Thus, motor vehicles are not regulated in the same way as mobile homes. Compare National Traffic 
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563,80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 138lff(1988 & Supp. III 1991)), with National Mobile Home Construction and Safety Standards 
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 700 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401 et seq. (1994)). 
14 For an excellent historical account of cigarette smoking, see RICHARD KLuGER, AsHES ro AsHES: AMERicA's 
HUNDRED YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PuBLIC HEALTH AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS ( 1996). 
15 The type of government regulation affecting the tobacco industry, at least until recently, might be 
explained under public-choice theory, which views the political process through the lens of economic analy-
sis, and legislation as a commodity to be bought and sold; legislative decisionmaking, under this theory, can 
lead to arbitrary and discriminatory results, often yields outcomes that favor private interest groups, and 
bestows economic gain beyond what the free market would produce. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics 
Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 
283-95 (1988); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 223, 227-33 (1986); see generally ANTHONY 
DOWNS, AN EcoNOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979). 
16 Pub. L. No. 75-717,52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.). 
17 See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976). 
18 See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990), as 
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tiona! smoking products such as Company A's new cigarette have for the most part 
managed to escape direct government regulation, 19 although the days of this near-
total immunity seem to be limited.2° Company C's risk-reduction product falls some-
where in between the products under consideration by Companies A and B, inasmuch 
as it possesses characteristics of both. The regulatory burdens Company C might face 
are at this point somewhat uncertain. 
In marketing their products, Companies A and B will not be competing with each 
other. Indeed, in a grotesque sense they are playing on the same side, because the devel-
opment of new products that increase tobacco dependence increases the need and de-
mand for new products that provide relief from tobacco dependence. 
Both entities, however, will be competing with Company C, which seeks to promote 
a product that will appeal to tobacco users who might otherwise purchase Company A's 
new tobacco product/1 or who might resort to Company B's new treatment to reduce 
risks linked to the consumption of tobacco products. 
This article will undertake a comparative analysis of the regulatory barriers fac-
ing the three hypothetical firms. It would seem reasonable to begin, in part II, with an 
analysis ofthe type of regulation Company B would have to surmount, so that it will 
be easier to delineate, in part III, the type oflicense Company A would have enjoyed 
(at least until recently), and the new type of regulation it might have to face today. 
This, in tum, will facilitate an exploration, in part IV, of the possible burdens facing 
Company C. 
The purpose of this article is to facilitate a policy analysis of the implications of 
the discrepancies in the regulatory framework currently confronting innovation in the 
fields of tobacco and tobacco-dependence treatment products. 
II. THE REGULATION OF TOBACCO-DEPENDENCE TREATMENT PRODUCTS 
A. In General 
The first products marketed as aids to smoking cessation date back to the early 
19 See generally part Ill infra. The most notable exception has been in the federal regulation oflabeling and 
advertising cigarettes. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 283 
(1965), replaced by Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341), discussed infra at part lii (B) (4). For a useful account of the history of the 
1965 Act, see A. LEE FRITSCHLER, SMOKING AND PoLmcs: POLICYMAK!NG AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1969). 
Cigarette manufacturers also have enjoyed a remarkable degree of success avoiding civil liability at 
the hands of consumers claiming injury from the use of the products. See Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and 
Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort Liability, in SMOKING PoLicY: LAw, POLITICS, AND CuLTURE ch. 6 (R. 
Rabin & S. Sugarman eds. 1993); Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, id. ch. 7. For contrast-
ing views on the desirability of holding the tobacco industry liable in tort for smoking-related harm, com-
pare Donald W. Gamer, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers: A Modest 
Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423 (1980), with Gregory P. Tax in, Tobacco Industry Liability for Cigarette-
Related Injuries: "Smokers, Give It Up!," 16 J. PROD. & Toxic LIAB. 221 (1994). 
20 See infra part III (C). The days of the industry's immunity from civil liability also may be numbered. 
For accounts of recent litigation that has begun to breach the wall of immunity, see CARRICK MoLLENKAMP ET 
AL., THE PEOPLE V. BIG TOBACCO: How THE STATES TOOK ON THE CIGARETTE GIANTS (1998); PETER PRINGLE, 
CORNERED: BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR OF JUSTICE (1998). 
21 Indeed, the development of a reduced-risk cigarette by Company C might have significant product-
liability implications for Company A. It might present plaintiffs seeking damages from Company A for 
smoking-related harm the opportunity to develop proof that Company A's product was defective because at 
the time of its marketing there was a feasible, reasonably safe alternative design for cigarettes, and if such a 
design had been adopted, plaintiff would not have suffered harm. See RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs: PRoDUCTs 
LIABILITY § 2(b) (Proposed Final Draft Apr. I, 1997). 
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part of the twentieth century and contained herbs, spices, or chemicals that sought to 
make the taste of tobacco unpleasant. 22 Recognition of the addictive properties of 
nicotine led to experimentation with nicotine-replacement therapies that first were 
administered intravenously, and that sought to wean smokers from their dependence 
on nicotine by providing them with reduced amounts of the substance. 23 
In 1984, for the first time the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved a 
replacement therapy in the form of a gum that released nicotine when chewed prop-
erly. 24 In 1991 and 1992, the agency precleared four patches that released nicotine 
through the skin into the bloodstream.25 More recently, FDA approved a nicotine 
nasal spray and a vapor inhaler, 26 and authorized the marketing of an antidepressant, 
bupropion hydrochloride, for prescription-only use in the treatment of nicotine de-
pendence. 27 Moreover, the agency permitted the over-the-counter sales of both the 
gum and the patch.28 Several homeopathic medications also are available to consum-
ers wishing to escape dependence on nicotine.29 In addition, some aids to smoking 
cessation have taken the form of medical devices30 and dietary supplements. 31 
B. Tobacco-Dependence Treatment Products as "Drugs" 
1. The Statutory Definition of "Drug" 
The first step in determining what regulatory mechanisms the federal govern-
ment might use to regulate marketing of a new tobacco-dependence treatment prod-
uct involves fitting the product into a statutory definition. The most obvious location 
for a substance or combination of substances intended to help an individual to stop 
smoking would be the category of drug. 
amended by Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 
(1994). 
22 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH CoNSEQUENCES OF SMOKING- 25 
YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPoRT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 428 (1989). 
23 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING- NICOTINE 
AomcnoN: A REPoRT OF THE SuRGEON GENERAL 471 (1988). 
24 See id. at 471-79; see also Tamara Nordenberg, Which Nicotine Replacement Product Appeals to 
You?, FDA CONSUMER, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 22, 23. 
For a more detailed discussion of tobacco-dependence treatment medications, see Jack E. Henningfield, 
Tobacco-Dependence Medications: Public Health and Regulatory Issues, 53 Fooo & DRuG L.J. 75 (Supp. 1998). 
2
' See id. at 88. 
26 See Nordenberg, supra note 24, at 22. 
27 See Tamara Nordenberg, It's Quitting Time: Smokers Need Not Rely on Willpower Alone, FDA 
CoNSUMER, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 19, 21. 
28 See Nordenberg, supra note 24, at 22, 23. 
29 They include a cigarette-cessation tablet and a gum containing six homeopathic medicines. See 
Ciga"est, About the Formula (visited May I, 1998) <http://www.cigarrest.com/formula.htm>. 
30 One device is a receptacle for a pack of cigarettes. It generates, by a process of squeezing, tiny holes 
in the filters of each cigarette. The holes are designed to let air mix with the smoke from the cigarette, and 
produce a cooling effect that is claimed to condense and trap nicotine and other toxins. See Why Phaseout 
Works- (visited May I, 1998) <http://members.aol.com/freshairiilworks2.html>. Another is an artificial ciga-
rette with a cartridge that releases a flavor simulating the sensation of inhaling from a cigarette. It is meant 
to replicate smoking by occupying the hands of the consumer and releasing a mint-like flavor into the 
mouth and lungs. See E-Z Quit Smokeless Artificial Cigarette System (visited May I, 1998) <http:// 
www.quitsmoking.com/ezquit.htm>. 
31 See Henningfield, supra note 24, at 90; see also Metacalm -S, The Natural Way to Become Smoke Free 
(visited May I, 1998) <http://www.metabolic.com/metas.htm> (information about dietary supplement intended 
to help smokers manage the nervousness and craving that accompany nicotine withdrawal, and to provide vita-
mins, minerals, amino acids, and herbs that help body normalize metabolic pathways affected by smoking). 
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Tobacco-dependence treatment products might fall within the definition of"drug" 
under the FDCA in one of two ways. The nicotine in tobacco has been shown to cause 
physical dependence on, or even addiction to, tobacco products.32 Such addiction or 
dependence could be considered a disease. 33 A product intended by its manufacturer to 
cure or mitigate a disease is by definition a "drug" under the statute. 34 
Alternatively, addiction or physical dependence may be viewed as conditions af-
fecting the functioning of the body of the affiicted individual. 35 A product intended by 
its manufacturer to lessen or eliminate addiction or dependence thereby also would 
affect a bodily function, and hence would come within a second prong of the "drug" 
definition.36 
2. The Consequences of Being Classified as a Drug 
A manufacturer whose product comes within the statutory category of "drug" 
becomes subject to the various strictures of the FDCA, which is administered and 
enforced by FDA. 37 Of most significance is the fact that the manufacturer must avoid 
committing an act prohibited by law, such as the adulteration38 or misbranding of the 
drug,39 or the refusal, under certain circumstances, to permit FDA inspectors to enter 
the manufacturer's place ofbusiness.4° FDA has broad discretion in deciding whether 
or not to seek legal action against someone who has allegedly committed a prohibited 
act.41 If the agency initiates an enforcement proceeding,42 penalties that a court may 
impose include seizure of the product,43 an injunction,44 and even a fine or imprison-
ment.45 FDA also may use the threat of enforcement to negotiate a voluntary recall of 
products already on the market,46 and may generate publicity that might be adverse to 
32 See generally THE HEALTII CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING- NICOTINE ADDICTION, supra note 23; see 
also Henningfield, supra note 24, at 80. 
33 See Analysis Regarding Food and Drug Administration's Jurisdiction Over Nicotine-Containing 
Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,453, 41,786 (Aug. II, 1995). 
34 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(l)(B) ("[t]he term 'drug' means ... articles intended for use in the ... cure, 
mitigation, [or] treatment of disease in man ... "). 
35 See 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,468. 
36 See 21 U.S.C. § 32l(g)(l)(C) ("[t]he term 'drug' means ... articles ... intended to affect ... any 
function of the body of man ... "). A third definitional alternative, being listed in one of several named 
pharmaceutical compendia (id. § 321 (g)(l)(A)), might also apply. For a discussion of the difficulties that 
might arise from the use of this subsection, see infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. 
37 See Pub. L. No. 100-607, § 503(a), 102 Stat. 3048,3121 (1988) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 393) (establishing authority of Commissioner of Food and Drugs over the administration of the Act). FDA 
has authority to promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of the FDCA. 21 U.S.C. § 37l(a). 
These regulations, under certain circumstances, may carry the force of law. See National Nutritional Foods 
Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975). 
38 See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). For specifics on what constitutes the adulteration of a drug, see id. § 351. 
39 See id. § 331 (a). For specifics on what constitutes the misbranding of a drug, see id. § 352. 
40 Seeid. § 331(t). 
41 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, 
whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion"). 
42 FDA recommends enforcement, but it is the U.S. Department of Justice that makes the ultimate 
decision whether to go ahead with the proceeding. See Developments in the Law: The Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, 67 HARV. L. REv. 632, 683-84 ( 1954); Twelfth Survey of White Collar Crime: Federal 
Food and Drug Act Violations, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 645, 656 (1997). 
43 See 21 U.S.C. § 334. 
44 See id. § 332. 
45 See id. § 333. For a good summary of the most recent developments in the use of the Act's criminal 
sanctions, see Federal Food and Drug Act Violations, supra note 42, at 660-62. 
46 See I. Scott Bass, Enforr:ement Powers of the Food and Drug Administration: Foods, Dietary Supple-
ments, and Cosmetics, in I FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION: AN IN-DEPTH LooK AT Fooos, VETERINARY 
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a manufacturer's interests.47 
Falling into the statutory category of drugs has one immediate implication for a 
manufacturer who has never before engaged in the production of this type of product, 
namely the necessity of registering with FDA. 48 
3. Tobacco-Dependence Treatment Products as New Drugs 
The FDCA divides the universe of drugs into new drugs and products that do not 
fall within the category of new drugs.49 By definition a "new drug" is a drug "the com-
position of which is such that such drug is not generally recognized, among experts 
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness 
of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, 
or suggested in the labeling thereof .... "5° FDA has taken the view that general recog-
nition of safety and efficacy on the part of qualified experts must be based on scientific 
evidence, rather than personal experience or anecdotes, 51 a position that has been up-
held by the U.S. Supreme Court. 52 
A new smoking-cessation product probably would not have generated sufficient 
scientific data on which qualified experts might base a recognition of safety and efficacy. 
Hence, in all likelihood it would fall within the definition of, and would be subject to 
regulation as, a new drug. 
4. New Drug Approval Process 
a. General Requirements 
A product deemed to be a new drug may not be introduced into interstate commerce 
unless FDA has precleared it, and marketing of an unapproved new drug is a prohibited 
act under the law. 53 The process of preclearance places a considerable burden on the 
company or individual seeking to place the drug on the market. Similar to any other new 
drug, a tobacco-dependence treatment product may not be marketed in interstate com-
merce before FDA has made a determination that it is both safe and effective under the 
approved conditions of its use. 54 
The process that an applicant for FDA approval must follow is rigorous, expen-
sive, and time-consuming, 55 which has given rise to criticism that it has kept useful 
MEDICINES, AND COSMETICS 55, 70-72 (R. Brady, R. Cooper & R. Silverman eds. 1997) [hereinafter I FUNDAMEN-
TALS]. 
47 See 21 U.S.C. § 375. 
48 See id. § 360(b) (providing that new producers of drugs must provide FDA with their names and ad-
dresses). 
49 A product falling into the latter category might be called "not a new drug" or an "old drug." Today 
a drug not considered a new drug would be subject to regulation under the Over-the-Counter Drug Review 
and would be called an over-the-counter drug. See part (II) (B) (8) infra. 
50 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(l). A second category of new drugs includes drugs whose safety and efficacy has 
been recognized as a result of investigations, but which have not been used to a material extent or for a 
material time under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling./d. § 321(p)(2). 
51 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.2(b)(3) (1997). 
"See Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973); Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott 
& Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973). 
53 See 21 U.S.C. § 331(d). 
"The relevant statutory provision is found at 21 U.S.C. § 355, which sets out in detail the procedures 
that must be followed and the standards that must be applied before a new drug may be marketed legally. On 
new drug development generally, see U.S. FooD & DRUG ADMIN., FROM TEST-TUBE TO PATIENT: NEW DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES - AN FDA CONSUMER SPECIAL REPORT (2d ed. Jan. 1995). 
"See J.A. DiMasi, New Drug Development: Cost, Risk & Complexity, 29 DRUG INFO. J. 375 (1995). 
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new medications off the market, to the detriment of patients who could be helped by 
them. 56 
An applicant, called the sponsor, may begin animal testing on a new drug without 
FDA's permission. 57 The purpose of these tests is to see whether the drug has the 
desired effect, to find a toxic level for the drug, to estimate what the safe level in 
humans might be, and to determine how the drug is metabolized and excreted in 
animals. 58 
If animal tests indicate that the drug has promise, the sponsor next submits to 
FDA a "Notice of Claimed Investigational Exemption," which informs the agency 
about the composition of the new drug, its source, and how it is made. The notice also 
must contain the results of all the animal tests. 59 FDA has thirty days to review the 
submission. If the agency does not disapprove, the investigational new drug exemp-
tion (IND) takes effect and testing on humans may begin.60 
Clinical trials involve three phases: tests orl·healthy volunteers to determine drug 
metabolism and excretion, and also to calculate the potential of the drug to produce 
adverse effects in humans; tests on small groups of patients to determine the drug's 
efficacy, and also to see whether there are any adverse effects within the dosage range 
required to produce therapeutic results; and tests on larger groups of patients to ob-
serve the safety and efficacy of the drug within its environment ofuse.61 
If the sponsor of the new medication believes that it has passed muster, it will file 
a new drug application (NDA) with FDAY The NDA must contain all safety and 
efficacy data gathered during the clinical tests, which may amount to as many as 
fifteen volumes of material. 63 This process has become even more costly as a result of 
statutory amendments imposing user fees on NDA applicants.64 
Under the law, FDA has 180 days to review and either approve or reject an NDA. 65 
As a practical matter, the agency generally takes longer, although it has been steadily 
reducing the average time required to process NDAs. 66 
FDA's statutory responsibility is to determine whether the data submitted by the 
sponsor establishes that the drug is "safe for use under the conditions prescribed, 
s6 See Sam Kazman, Deadly Overcaution: FDA s Drug-Approval Process I J. REG. & Soc. CoSTs 35 
(1990). For an FDA Deputy Commissioner's defense of his agency's record on new drug approvals, see Will-
iam B. Schultz, We're Not Dragging Our Feet on New Drugs, WASH. PoST, Apr. 13, 1995, at A31. 
s? See 21 C.F.R. § 312.2(b)(3). 
s• See id. § 312.23(a)(8). 
s9 See id. pt. 56. If the sponsor plans to conduct clinical trials in an institution, such as a hospital, she 
must also obtain the approval of the institutional review board within the institution. See Geoffrey M. Levitt, 
James N. Czaban & Andrea S. Paterson, Human Drug Regulation, in 2 FuNDAMENTALS OF LAw AND REGuLA-
noN: AN IN-DEPTH Loox AT THERAPEUTIC PRODUCTS !59, 165 (D. Adams, R. Cooper & J. Kahan eds. 1997) 
[hereinafter 2 FUNDAMENTALS]. 
60 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.40. 
61 See id. § 312.21. 
62 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50. 
63 See PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRuG LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 519 (2d 
ed. 1991) (citing Report of the Subcomm. on Science, Research, and Technology of the House Comm. on 
Science and Technology, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)). 
64 See Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codified at 21 
U.S.C. §§ 379g-379h). These fee requirements were scheduled to expire in October 1997. /d.§ 105, 106 Stat. 
at4498. They were renewed under the FDA Modernization Act ofl997. Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 103, Ill Stat. 
2296, 2299-2304 (1997) . 
., See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(l). 
66 See David A. Kessler, Remarks by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 52 FooD & DRuG L.J. I 
(1997); GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE, FDA DRUG APPROVAL: REviEw TIME HAs DEcREASED IN REcENT YEARS 
(Oct. 1995). 
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recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof,"67 and that there is "sub-
stantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have 
under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed 
labeling thereof."68 
The statute nowhere defines the critical term "safe" as it applies to new drugs. In 
practice, FDA has determined that drug safety is a relative concept, to be assessed in 
light of the potential risks that accompany the use of any drug, and the agency will 
weigh those risks against the benefits to be gained by consumers for whom the prod-
uct is prescribed.69 Thus, if a tobacco-dependence treatment product introduces nico-
tine into the human body, the agency must consider the potential risks involved. They 
may derive from the addictive effects of nicotine, or from other effects that have been 
associated with the product. The agency must assess these risks against the advan-
tages to be derived from the use of the drug. There is no statutory requirement that 
safety be supported by any specific amount of evidence. 
The efficacy requirement tests whether a new drug accomplishes what it is meant 
to do. The statutory language directs the agency to refuse to approve an NDA if 
"there is a lack of substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or 
is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or sug-
gested in the proposed labeling thereof."70 Thus, it is the sponsor of the new drug who 
determines the intended effect of the medication, and it is FDA's responsibility to 
determine whether the evidence submitted by the sponsor establishes that the drug 
will have its intended effect. 
In the case of tobacco-dependence treatment products meant to break the 
consumer's addiction to nicotine, FDA would have to determine how long a user of 
the drug would need to have refrained from smoking before the medication is judged 
to be effective.71 
A more troublesome issue arises with respect to tobacco-dependence treatments 
that promise less than total withdrawal from the use of cigarettes or other tobacco 
products. FDA has not yet approved any indications other than smoking cessation. 72 
Whether the agency lawfully may disapprove an NDA containing substantial evi-
dence that the drug under review can provide, for example, relief of nicotine-with-
drawal symptoms or a mere reduction in the craving for nicotine is open to question. 73 
Efficacy must be demonstrated by "substantial evidence," which the statute de-
fines as 
evidence of well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, 
by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the ef-
67 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
68 See id. 
69 See HUTI & MERRILL, supra note 63, at 522-24 (citing Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House 
Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964)). 
1o 21 U.S.C § 355(d)(5). 
11 In a regulation assessing, inter alia, the effectiveness of nonprescription smoking-deterrent medica-
tions, FDA took the position that the smoking status of subjects taking the product on a trial basis should be 
evaluated at the end of four months to determine efficacy. See Smoking Deterrent Products for Over-the-
Counter Human Use, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,236, 31,238 (June I, 1993). 
12 See Henningfield, supra note 24, at 86. Moreover, the agency has rejected smoking reduction as a 
criterion for assessing the efficacy of nonprescription drugs. See infra note I 08 and accompanying text. 
13 A legal ground the agency might assert for disapproval is that "based on a fair evaluation of all 
material facts, [the proposed] labeling is false or misleading." 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(7). FDA would have to 
ground such an assertion on the conviction that any indication other than smoking cessation would be of no 
real benefit to tobacco users, and, therefore, that labeling a drug for this use would deceive consumers. 
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fectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and 
responsibly concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it 
purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, rec-
ommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof.74 
Because of the use of the term "investigations" in the plural, FDA generally required 
that the sponsor present evidence of more than one study establishing a new drug's 
efficacy.75 The FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA}, however, has lessened this 
burden by giving FDA discretion to determine that data from one adequate and well-
controlled clinical investigation, plus confirmatory evidence, might amount to substan-
tial evidence of efficacy. 76 
The "new drug" approval process enables FDA to pass judgment not only upon the 
safety and efficacy of the product in question, but also on the proposed labeling. A 
finding that the labeling is "false or misleading in any particular" will justify a refusal to 
approve an NDA.77 
b. "Fast -Track" Requirements 
A phenomenon known as the "AIDS Revolution," brought about by pressure from 
HIV-infected individuals, AIDS sufferers, and their supporters, has produced a number 
of dramatic changes in the process by which FDA approves new drugs intended for use 
in the treatment of the AIDS Syndrome.78 These modifications, developed administra-
tively by FDA, inter alia, shortened the time necessary for the approval of NDAs by 
changing the standard by which efficacy is measured. Normally, the objective criterion 
used to test the effectiveness of a drug intended to treat a life-threatening disease is 
survival, what is known as a clinical endpoint. In place of this clinical endpoint, FDA 
has permitted the use of surrogate endpoints, such as improvements in negative condi-
tions known to be linked with a disease, to determine efficacy.79 The agency subse-
quently took steps to apply these new rules to drugs intended to treat other serious or 
life-threatening diseases. 80 
FDAMA in effect ratified what the agency FDA had done and permits the agency 
to use so-called "fast-track" procedures for any new drug intended to treat a serious or 
life-threatening condition and shown to have the potential to meet unmet medical 
needs for such a condition.81 A new drug found by FDA to meet these two criteria may 
be approved if the agency concludes that it "has an effect on a clinical endpoint or on 
74 I d. § 355( d)(7). 
75 See Statement Regarding the Demonstrations of Effectiveness of Human Drug Products and De-
vices, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,180, 39,181 (Aug. I, 1995). 
76 Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 115, Ill Stat. at2313 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)). 
77 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). This means that, in effect, FDA prescribes the information that must appear 
on the labeling of a "new drug." See Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 
VA. L. REv. I, II (1973). 
78 See generally Mary M. Dunbar, Shaking Up the Status Quo: How AIDS Activists Have Challenged 
Drug Development and Approval Procedures, 46 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 673 (1991). 
79 See Ronald Podraza, The FDA s Response to AIDS, 48 Fooo & DRUG L.J. 351, 359, 367 (1993). For 
a cautionary commentary on FDA's policy toward AIDS treatment, see Matthew C. Lovell, Second Thoughts: 
Do the FDAs Responses to a Fatal Drug Trial and the AIDS Activist Communitys Doubts About Early 
Access to Drugs Hint at a Shift in Basic FDA Policy?, 51 FooD & DRUG L.J. 273 (1996). 
80 See New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations: Accelerated Approval, 57 
Fed. Reg. 58,942 (Dec. II, 1992). 
81 Pub. L. No. I 05-115, § 112, Ill Stat. at 2309 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 356). The terms "serious or 
life-threatening" would seem to encompass grave conditions, such as nicotine addiction, that do not have an 
immediate adverse effect but can lead to deadly consequences over the long term. 
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a surrogate endpoint that is reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit."82 
A new smoking-cessation product might qualify for these abbreviated procedures 
if tobacco dependence qualifies as a serious or life-threatening condition, and if the 
drug offers reasonable hope of achieving results not produced by medicines already on 
the market. In addition, the sponsor would have to convince FDA that there is an avail-
able surrogate endpoint that might be used to test the drug's effectiveness. 
5. Post-Approval Obligations 
FDA preclearance for safety and efficacy does not terminate the legal obliga-
tions of the holder of an NDA. The latter has a continuing duty to maintain the basis 
on which the agency granted its approval. If at any point FDA has reason to believe 
that the available data no longer support the conclusion that a new drug is safe for its 
intended use and that there is substantial evidence of efficacy, the agency may termi-
nate the approval, 83 which means that the product must be withdrawn from the mar-
ket. 
In addition, the FDCA requires that the holder of an approved NDA maintain such 
records and make such reports to FDA as the agency may mandate.84 FDA regulations 
require that the NDA holder provide the agency with prompt reports of any adverse 
reactions associated with the drug.85 
A new drug that qualifies for the new fast-track procedures under FDAMA may be 
subject to additional postapproval requirements, such as the conducting of studies to 
validate the surrogate endpoint or otherwise confirm the drug's effect on the clinical 
endpoint. 86 
6. Changes in an Approved New Drug 
Once FDA has approved an NDA, the sponsor legally may market the drug in 
conformity with the conditions detailed in the document. If the sponsor wishes to make 
minor alterations in the composition or labeling of the product or in the manufacturing 
process, he must obtain preclearance from the agency through the mechanism of a supple-
ment to the approved NDA.87 If, on the other hand, the sponsor wishes to add a new 
indication to those already listed in an approved NDA, he would have to submit the 
results of tests that support the indication and obtain FDA approval for the new use to 
which he seeks to put the drug. 88 
7. Regulation of Drug Distribution 
a. In General 
The FDCA gives FDA no general authority to regulate the distribution of new 
drugs that the agency has precleared for introduction into interstate commerce. The 
agency did make one notable effort to -impose distribution controls on methadone, 
82 Id. (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 356(b)(l)). 
83 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(e). 
84 See id. § 355(k). 
85 21 C.F.R. § 314.80. 
86 See Pub. L. No. I 05-115, § 112(a), Ill Stat. at 2309 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 356(b)(2)(A)). 
87 See Levitt, Czaban & Paterson, supra note 59, at 176-78. 
88 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.54. 
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which had been approved for use as an analgesic and an antitussive agent, shipments 
of which the agency wanted to limit to approved maintenance treatment programs and 
approved hospital pharmacies; but the courts held that this initiative fell beyond FDA's 
statutory mandate.89 Hence, once the agency has approved an NDA, it may not place 
restrictions on how the product is made available to consumers. 90 
b. Distribution Limitations Under the Controlled Substances 
Act 
Although the FDCA does not expressly permit the imposition of distribution con-
trols on new drugs, Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
Act of 1970, also known as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), permits the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), acting in consultation with FDA, to place dispen-
sation limits on drugs found to have a potential for abuse.91 Thus, if a tobacco-depen-
dence treatment medication contains nicotine, an addictive substance, and the nature of 
the product combined with the probable circumstances of its consumption present a 
likelihood of abuse, DEA and FDA might consider listing it under the CSA. 92 
c. Limitation to Sale by Prescription Only 
FDA approval, however, may be conditioned on one very significant limitation, 
which provides that a drug may be sold only by prescriptions written by authorized 
health-care providers. As a practical matter, this limitation derives from the agency's 
authority to regulate the labeling of drugs. On a finding that the drug cannot be admin-
istered safely without the intervention of a physician, FDA may require that the label of 
the product bear the statement "Caution: Federal law prohibits dispensing without pre-
scription."93 Such a finding may derive from the fact that the drug is habit-forming;94 
that the approved NDA includes a determination that the administration of the drug 
requires the supervision of a licensed practitioner;95 or that because of the drug's toxic-
ity, method of its use, or collateral measures necessary to its use it is not safe except 
under the supervision of a licensed practitioner. 96 In actual practice, the most common 
method FDA uses to restrict a new drug to prescription sale only is by including that 
limitation as a condition of the drug's approved NDA. 
The legal standards for classifying a product as a new drug (that the drug is not 
generally recognized as safe and effective) and for limiting a drug to prescription sale 
only (that the drug cannot safely be used except under the supervision of a licensed 
practitioner) are not identical. Therefore, an approved new drug need not be placed on 
prescription-only status, but may, if FDA so determines, be safe enough for over-the-
counter (OTC) sales. Hence, the agency might switch to OTC status a new drug that 
previously had been limited to prescription-only status97 (as it has already done for 
89 See American Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1974), a.ff'd, 530 F.2d 
1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam). 
90 FDA, however, may approve NDAs for new drugs on which manufacturers have placed voluntary 
controls on distribution. See Hun & MERRILL, supra note 63, at 635. 
91 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.). 
92 The criteria for listing are spelled out in 21 U .S.C. § 811. 
93 See id. § 353(b)(4) (FDCA § 503(b)(4)). 
94 See id. § 353(b)(1)(A) (FDCA § 503(b)(I)(A)). 
9
' See id. § 353(b)(I)(C) (FDCA § 503(b)(I)(C)). 
96 See id. § 353(b)(I)(B) (FDCA § 503 (b)(I)(B)). 
97 For discussion of so-called "OTC switches," see Peter Barton Hutt, Framework for Future Deci-
sions on Transferring Drugs from Prescription to Nonprescription Status, 37 Fooo DRUG COSM. L.J. 427 
(1982); Kaplan et al., Over-the-Counter Drugs, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 59, at 233, 238-41. 
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two tobacco-dependence treatment products)98 or it might approve an NDA without 
requiring that the new drug be sold by prescription only. 
8. Regulation of Over-the-Counter Drugs 
Until the 1970s, all but a handful of OTC drugs had come on the market without 
any FDA preclearance. The controlling assumption was that they were generally rec-
ognized as safe, and hence not new drugs. The 1962 Amendments to the FDCA99 had 
added the requirement that new drug status include a determination that a medication 
was not generally recognized as effective, 100 and for the first time required a finding 
of efficacy before a new drug could be approved by the agency. 101 The amendments 
also directed FDA to apply the new rules to drugs already on the market; 102 because 
OTC medicines number in the hundreds of thousands, this promised to be a formi-
dable task. 103 
In response, beginning in 1971, FDA undertook a massive study of all OTC drugs. 
What came to be known as the OTC Review was an innovative undertaking that uti-
lized panels of independent experts to review all the active ingredients found in OTC 
drugs and all the claims made for these ingredients. 104 The panels recommended to 
the agency which of these ingredients were generally recognized as safe and which 
claims were not misleading. FDA then decided which of these recommendations to 
accept, and used administrative rulemaking to promulgate regulations with the force 
oflaw. These regulations would, in effect, state what active ingredients could be used 
and what labeling claims could be made in OTC drugs. Nonprescription medicines 
with unapproved active ingredients or unapproved labeling claims could be removed 
from the market. 105 
One of the expert panels considered tobacco-dependence treatment OTC drugs, 
and concluded in 1985 that no active ingredient found in them had been demonstrated 
to be generally recognized as safe and effective for use as an OTC smoking-cessation 
medicine. 106 FDA accepted the panel's finding in a final regulation published in 1993.107 
The agency agreed with the panel that the only claim appropriate for an OTC smok-
ing deterrent was smoking cessation, and refused to include smoking reduction as a 
standard for efficacy. 108 
98 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
99 Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962). 
100 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (FDCA § 201(p)). 
101 /d.§ 355(d) (FDCA § 505(d)). 
102 Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 107(c), 76 Stat. at 788. For a concise summary of these provisions, see Note, 
Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 GEo. L.J. 185, 195 (1971). 
103 At this time, FDA estimated that between 100,000 and 500,000 separate OTC products were on the 
market. See FDA Formally Proposes Extensive Review of Non-Prescription Drugs' Effectiveness, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 5, 1972, at 4. 
104 See 37 Fed. Reg. 85 (Jan. 5, 1972). 
105 For general descriptions of the OTC Review, see Charles C. Ames & Steven C. McCracken, Fram-
ing Regulatory Standards to Avoid Formal Adjudication: The FDA As a Case Study, 64 CAL. L. REv. 14 
(1976); Note, FDA s Over-the-Counter Drug Review: Expeditious Enforcement by Rulemaking, II MtcH. 
J.L. REFORM 142 (1977). 
106 See Smoking Deterrent Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use: Tentative Final Mono-
graph, 50 Fed. Reg. 27,552 (July 3, 1985). 
107 See Smoking Deterrence Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,236 
(June I, 1993). 
108 See id. at 31,238. 
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9. Regulation of the Promotion of Drugs 
a. In General 
A company planning to market a new medicine intended to combat tobacco depen-
dence must consider not only the legal hurdles it would have to vault in order to gain 
approval by FDA, but also the restrictions the law places on the promotion of drug 
products. 
There are two approaches FDA may take to limit how companies may stimulate 
sales of their products. The first is to use its authority over drug labeling, and to 
interpret as broadly as possible the definition of the term "labeling." The second is to 
resort to authority Congress granted for the specific purpose of regulating advertise-
ments. 
b. Restrictions on Labeling 
The statute defines "labeling" as "all labels and other written, printed, or graphic 
matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying 
such article."109 FDA has interpreted the term as including such items as brochures, 
booklets, letters, literature, sound recordings, and motion pictures. 110 To be regulated as 
labeling, written or graphic matter that is not on the drug product, its container, or its 
wrapper must accompany the drug. The term "accompany" has been given a meaning 
expansive enough to encompass instances in which the material, although shipped sepa-
rately, shared both the origin and destination of the drug. 111 
FDA has used this authority to prevent manufacturers from promoting to prescrib-
ing physicians unapproved uses of a drug. 112 Thus, if Company B already marketed a 
drug that had been approved for purposes other than combating tobacco dependence 
but there was some evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, that the drug might be useful in 
helping people to stop smoking, the Company could not publicize the latter use through 
the product's labeling, as broadly defined by FDA. 
FDAMA has eased this restriction by permitting manufacturers to engage in the 
limited distribution of written information about unapproved uses of a drug, and by 
setting out ground rules for such distribution. 113 
c. Prescription-Drug Advertising 
At one time manufacturers promoted prescription drugs only to the medical profes-
sion, mainly through advertisements in medical journals. 114 Congress clearly had this 
kind of promotion in mind when it gave FDA authority to enforce requirements that 
every advertisement and "other descriptive printed matter issued ... by the manufac-
turer" and intended to promote the sale of prescriptions drugs carry, inter alia, a 
"brief summary relating to side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness." 115 FDA 
109 21 U.S.C. § 32l(m) (FDCA § 201(m)). 
11° For a long illustrative list, see 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(2). 
111 See Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Judith E. Beach, Adulteration and Misbranding of Drugs, in 2 FUNDAMEN-
TALS, supra note 59, at 205, 215. 
112 See generally David A. Kessler, Regulating the Prescribing of Human Drugs for Nonapproved 
Uses under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 15 HARV. J. LEGIS. 693 (1978); see also William L. Christo-
pher, Off-Label Drug Prescriptions: Filling the Regulatory Vacuum, 48 Fooo & DRuG L.J. 247 (1993). 
113 See Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 401, Ill Stat. at 2356 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aaa-aaa-5). 
114 See Richard B. Ruge, Regulation of Prescription Drug Advertising: Medical Progress and Private 
Enterprise, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 650 (1967). 
115 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (FDCA § 502(n)). 
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regulations fleshing out this legal authority explain that the statute permits the agency 
to take action against advertisements that are false, misleading, or lacking in fair 
balance. 116 
In the 1980s, pharmaceutical companies began to advertise directly to consum-
ers in magazines and newspapers. 117 At first FDA secured a voluntary moratorium on 
such promotions, to determine how they might be regulated under the agency's exist-
ing authority. 118 The moratorium lasted only for a few years. 119 When direct-to-con-
sumer advertising resumed, FDA took the position that the statutory requirements did 
not apply if an advertisement mentioned only the name of the product or only the 
symptom or symptoms for which the product might be useful. 120 This resulted in some 
rather mystifying television advertisements that sought either to impress a trade name 
on consumers without telling them what the product was intended to treat, or to stress 
symptoms along with the suggestion that consumers detecting them should consult 
their physicians. 121 
This was an unsatisfactory state of affairs, so in 1997 FDA changed its position and 
published guidelines that sanctioned the use of both the name of a drug and its indica-
tions of use, as long as the advertisement provided information about major risks asso-
ciated with the drug and adequate provision for the dissemination of full information 
about side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness. 122 
d. Nonprescription Drug Advertising 
In 1938, Congress gave the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) the authority to 
regulate the advertising of all drug products. 123 In the 1962 Amendments to the FDCA, 
Congress opted to shift to FDA legal responsibility for regulating prescription drug 
advertising. 124 The FTC, however, retained its authority over OTC drug advertising. 
Therefore, the manufacturer of nonprescription medications is subject to the re-
quirements of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits advertising that is 
deceptive 125 and contains specific provisions sanctioning drug advertisements that 
are misleading in any material respect. 126 FTC considers as deceptive any claim for 
which the advertiser has no reasonable substantiation when the claim is made. 127 
116 21 C.F.R. § 202.1. 
117 See Tamara Nordenberg, Direct to You: TV Drug Ads That Make Sense, FDA CoNSUMER, Jan.-Feb. 
1998, at 7, 8. 
118 See FooD & DRUG ADMIN., POLICY STATEMENT: VOLUNTARY MORATORIUM ON DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER AD-
VERTISING (1983). 
119 See Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs; Withdrawal of Moratorium, 50 Fed. Reg. 
36,677 (Sept. 9, 1995). 
120 See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DIY. OF DRUG MARKETING, ADVERTISING AND COMMUNICATION, 
CURRENT iSSUES AND PROCEDURES (1994). 
121 See Nordenberg, supra note 117, at 9; Samuel Goldreich, Mystery Medication: FDA Rules Lead to 
Ads Without Name of Product, WASH. TIMES, July 3, 1997, at B7. 
122 See Draft Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,171 
(Aug. 12, 1997). Adequate provision might constitute furnishing an "800" number, an e-mail address, or the 
address of a Website on the Internet where consumers might obtain complete information about the product. 
Television advertisements already have begun to promote the sale of one of the prescription-only medications 
approved for the treatment of nicotine dependence, buproprion hydrochloride. 
123 See Wheeler-Lea Amendments, Pub. L. No. 75-447,52 Stat. Ill (1938)(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 
44, 45, 52-58). 
124 See Pub. L. No. 87-781,76 Stat. at 780. 
125 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l). 
126 Id. §§ 52, 55. Section 55 specifically states that the failure to reveal material facts might amount to 
false advertising. 
127 FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation Program, 49 Fed. Reg. 30,999, 31,000 
(Aug. 2, 1984). 
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If FTC concludes that an advertising claim is deceptive, it has the authority to issue 
a so-called "cease-and-desist" order prohibiting further use of the claim. 128 In addition, 
the Commission can compel future advertising to correct any misimpressions created 
by the deceptive advertisement. 129 
Because FTC regulates the advertising ofOTC drugs and FDA regulates the label-
ing of these products, it has been necessary for the agencies to coordinate their ef-
forts.130 
10. Regulation of Homeopathic Drugs 
Homeopathic medical treatment derives from the theory that certain diseases or 
conditions can be cured or ameliorated by giving patients small doses of substances or 
agents that would produce in healthy persons the symptoms displayed by patients. 131 
Homeopathic drugs are prepared from natural sources such as plants, and are diluted 
with diluents such as water or alcohol. 
The FDCA recognizes articles listed in the Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia as drugs. 132 
In addition, homeopathic remedies intended for use in the treatment or cure of disease 
have been held to fall within the statutory definition of drugs. 133 
FDA's position on homeopathic medications appears to be that they are subject to 
all statutory requirements and regulations governing drugs, but that the agency will 
enforce the law selectively, in accordance with published guidelines spelling out the 
conditions under which homeopathic drugs may be marketed. 134 FDA, therefore, could 
take regulatory action against homeopathic medicines intended for the treatment of 
nicotine dependence. 
C. Tobacco-Dependence Treatment Products as Medical Devices 
If Company B 's product takes the form of an instrument or contrivance intended to 
free users from tobacco dependence, it would fall within the statutory definition of 
"medical device," which encompasses an "instrument, ... contrivance, ... or similar 
article ... intended for use in the cure, mitigation, [or] treatment ... of disease ... or 
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body."135 As such it would be 
subject to a range of regulatory controls having their origin in the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976. 136 
128 See 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.31-2.34. 
129 See, e.g., In re Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975), modified and enforced, 562 F.2d 749 
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978); In re Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865, modified, 
83 F.T.C. I 05 (1973), enforced and modified in part, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976), modified, 90 F.T.C. 181 
(1977). 
130 See Caswell 0. Hobbs, Advertising/or Therapeutic Products, in 2 FuNDAMENTALS, supra note 59, at 
359, 379-82; Teresa M. Schwartz, The Need for Coordinated Regulation Among Federal Agencies, 43 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 1031, 1041-52 (1975) (FTC-FDA liaison). 
131 See 6 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 24 (15th ed. 1997). 
132 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(I)(A) (FDCA § 201(g)(I)(A)). 
133 See Mesery v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 548 (D. Nev. 1977). 
134 See Kaplan et al., supra note 97, at 242-45. 
m 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (FDCA § 201(h)). Such a device would qualify as treating a disease or affecting 
a bodily function for the same reasons that a substance intended to serve the same purposes would qualify as 
a drug. See part II (B) (I) supra. 
136 Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (I 976) (as amended by Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. I 01-629, I 04 Stat. 4511; Medical Device Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. I 02-300, I 06 Stat. 238; 
and FDA Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, Ill Stat. at 2296. 
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The statutory scheme calls first for the classification of the device according to 
the degree of risk it poses. The FDCA imposes general controls on Class I devices, 137 
permits the imposition of special controls (including performance standards) on Class 
II devices, 138 and mandates premarket approval for Class III devices. 139 
Class I controls might result in the imposition of requirements for recordkeeping 
and reporting, 140 and premarket notification. 141 The FDCA gives FDA discretion to 
engage in rulemaking for the purpose of developing performance standards for Class 
II devices to provide reasonable assurances of safety and efficacy. 142 The FDCA re-
quires premarket approval for Class III devices, 143 but FDA has permitted many new 
devices to enter the market only after the agency has been notified of the pending 
commercial introduction of the product. 144 
A medical device that delivered reduced amounts of nicotine into the human 
body probably would be regulated as a drug-device combination, which means that 
FDA would have discretion to choose among the regulatory tools it possesses to regu-
late new drugs and devices. 145 
D. Tobacco-Dependence Treatment Products as Dietary Supplements 
1. In General 
Suppose that Company B wants to market a vitamin, mineral, or herbal product 
intended to supplement the human diet and at the same time help consumers combat 
tobacco dependence. Under the statutory definitions in the FDCA, such a product clearly 
would fall within the categories of"food"146 and "dietary supplement."147 To market this 
product, what regulatory obstacles would Company B have to surmount? 
2. Dietary Supplements Making Disease-Related Claims 
The definition of"drug" embraces "articles intended for use in the ... cure, mitiga-
tion, [or] treatment ... of disease," 148 but excludes foods or dietary supplements that 
comply with certain specific requirements governing disease-related claims. 149 
137 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(l)(A) (FDCA § 513(a)(l)(A)). The Act provides that Class I status is justified 
when general controls are adequate to provide reasonable assurances of safety and efficacy, or, if not, the 
device is not intended for a use that would have substantial importance in preventing impairment of human 
health and does not carry with it an unreasonable risk of illness or injury. !d. 
138 !d. § 360c(a)(l )(B) (FDCA § 513(a)(l )(B)). The Act indicates that Class II status will rest on a 
finding that general controls are insufficient to provide reasonable assurances of the safety and efficacy of 
the device. !d. 
139 /d. § 360c(a)(l)(C) (FDCA § 513(a)(l)(C)). The statutory standard for a Class IJJ device is that 
neither general nor special controls would be adequate to provide reasonable assurances of safety and effi-
cacy, and the device is intended for a use that would have substantial importance in preventing the impair-
ment of human health, or it created a potential undue risk of injury or illness. !d. 
140 !d. § 360i (FDCA § 519). 
141 !d. § 360(k) (FDCA §51 O(k)). 
142 /d. § 360d (FDCA § 514). 
143Jd. § 360e (FDCA ~515). 
144 See Howard M. Holstein & Edward C. Wilson, Developments in Medical Device Regulation, in 2 
FUNDAMENTALS 257, 265-67. 
145 See part III (C) ( 4) infra for a more detailed discussion of these tools. 
146 See 21 U.S.C. § 32l(f) (FDCA § 20l(f)). 
147 See id. § 321(fi) (FDCA § 20l(tl)). 
148 /d. § 321(g)(l)(B) (FDCA § 201(g)(l)(B)). 
149 /d. § 32l(g)(l) (FDCA § 201(g)(l)). 
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The special rules applicable to dietary supplements limit disease-related claims to 
statements claiming benefits related to classical nutrient-deficiency diseases only. 150 
The FDCA goes on to postulate that if such a claim is permitted, it must carry with it 
disclaimers that "This product is not intended to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent any 
disease" 151 and "A statement under this subparagraph may not claim to diagnose, miti-
gate, treat, cure, or prevent a specific disease or class of diseases."152 Thus, it would 
seem that if dependence on or addiction to nicotine is considered a disease, and if the 
labeling of a dietary supplement claimed that the product was useful in providing relief 
for persons dependent on or addicted to tobacco products, it could be regulated as a 
drug, because its labeling did not comply with the rules that regulate disease-related 
claims. 
3. Dietary Supplements Making "Structure-or-Function" Claims 
If dependence or addiction is considered as a condition that affects the functioning 
of the human body, however, a tobacco-dependence treatment dietary supplement also 
might be viewed as affecting this function. 153 This might bring the product within a 
special provision permitting dietary supplements to bear statements describing how 
they affect a bodily function. 154 To make such a claim the manufacturer would have to 
be able to substantiate its truth, 155 and would have to include a disclaimer that FDA has 
not evaluated the statement and that the supplement is not intended to treat or cure any 
disease. 156 
III. THE REGULATION OF ToBAcco PRODUCTS 
A. In General 
Tobacco, which has created the need for smoking-cessation and other types of 
products designed to relieve dependence on the nicotine in tobacco, has been remark-
ably free of direct federal health regulation. Although Congress has enacted laws that 
govern the growing of tobacco and its packaging, that tax its sale, and that encourage 
restrictions on smoking, 157 no legislation seeks specifically and directly to diminish or 
eliminate health risks found to be caused by the consumption of tobacco products. 
It was not until 1996, when FDA asserted jurisdiction over cigarettes as both 
drugs and medical devices, 158 that the tobacco industry had to confront the possibility 
150 /d.§ 343(r)(6)(A) (FDCA § 403(r)(6)(A)). On the statutory evolution of this section, see William R. 
Pendergast, Dietary Supplements, in I FuNDAMENTALS, supra note 46, at 257, 271-73, 261-62. 
FDA recently has proposed regulations that define more specifically the criteria the agency will use to 
identifY disease-related claims. See Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning 
the Effect of the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,624, 23,626-28 (Apr. 29, 
1998). 
•s• 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(C) (FDCA § 403(r)(6)(c)). 
•s2 !d. § 343(r)(6) (FDCA § 403(r)(6)). 
ISJ See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
•s• 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(A) (FDCA § 403(r)(6)(A)). 
•ss /d. § 343(r)(6)(8) (FDCA § 403(r)(6)(B)). 
•s• /d. § 343(r)(6) (FDCA § 403(r)(6)). 
1s7 These laws are summarized and discussed in Susan H. Carchman, Should the FDA Regulate Nico-
tine-Containing Cigarettes? Has the Agency Established a Legal Basis, and If Not, Should Congress Grant 
It?, 51 FooD & DRuG L.J. 85, 90-93 (1996). 
•sa See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to 
Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (Aug. 28, 1996). 
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of governmental controls at or near the level of those applicable to tobacco-dependence 
treatment products. Whether FDA has exceeded its legal authority in undertaking this 
initiative is an issue currently before the courts, 159 so the fate of this new regulatory 
approach remains unclear. Adding to the uncertainty is current congressional consider-
ation of comprehensive legislation that seeks to solve all aspects of the public-health 
problem resulting from the widespread use of cigarettes and other tobacco products. 160 
This section of the article first will consider how tobacco products escaped regu-
lation before 1996, then it will examine the implications of FDA's tobacco regulation. 
B. Nonregulation ofTobacco Products Before 1996 
1. In General 
Although suspicions about the harmful effects of tobacco date back to the very 
beginnings of its widespread use, 161 it was not until the 1930s that laboratory tests 
began to confirm what many had suspected: there was a demonstrable association 
between smoking and lung disease. 162 Yet scientific uncertainties about the link be-
tween cigarettes and lung disease, the popularity of smoking as a cultural phenom-
enon in the United States, and the political power of the tobacco industry combined to 
discourage any meaningful action by the government. Moreover, the one statute that 
might have provided a tool to regulate consumer products containing tobacco turned 
out to be ill-suited to the task. 
2. Tobacco and the FDCA 
The drafters of the 1938 FDCA, building on the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 
1906, 163 might have established a regulatory framework for substances ingested into 
or applied to the surface ofthe human body for purposes of nutrition, taste or aroma, 
or for therapeutic or cosmetic purposes. So delineated, the scope of the Act would 
have included tobacco products. 
Both statutes, however, limited coverage to "food,"164 "drug," 165 "cosmetic," 166 
,. A U.S. District Court has upheld the agency's regulations. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. U.S. Food & 
Drug Admin., 958 F. Supp. I 060 (M.D.N.C. 1997). Its decision is under appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit, which recently has scheduled the case for reargument. See Suein L. Hwang & Ann 
Davis, Tobacco Firms' Hopes in Lawsuit Are Dashed by Reargument Order, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1998, at 
Bll. For articles discussing the legal validity of the FDA regulations, see Open Forum, 51 Fooo & DRUG 
L.J. 471-500 (1996). See also Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA's 
Effort to Regulate Tobacco Products, 48 ALA. L. REv. I (1996) (arguing regulations invalid); James T. 
O'Reilly, Tobacco and the Regulatory Earthquake: Why the FDA Will Prevail After the Smoke Clears, 24 
No. Kv. L. REv. 509 (1997) (arguing regulations valid). 
1
"" See, e.g., S. 1415, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); S. 1889, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); S. 1648, 
I 05th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1998); S. 1530, I 05th Cong., I st Sess. ( 1997). The Senate failed to pass S. 1415; on 
a motion to close off debate, the bill failed to attract the requisite number (60) of votes. See 144 CoNG. REc. 
S6479 (daily ed. June 17, 1998). 
161 In 1604 James I, King of England, railed against the smoking of tobacco as "harmful to the brain, 
dangerous to the lung." See KLuGER, supra note 14, at 15. 
162 See id. at 108-10. 
163 Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 ( 1906). 
164 21 U.S.C. § 32l(t) (FDCA § 20l(t))("[t]he term 'food' means (I) articles used for food or drink for 
man or other animals, (2) chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any such article"). 
165 See supra part II (B) (1). 
166 21 U.S.C. § 321(1) (FDCA § 201(1)) ("[t]he term 'cosmetic' means (I) articles intended to be 
rubbed, 
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and "medical device," 167 which were defined in ways that made it highly problematic 
to include substances inhaled into the body for purposes of taste and relaxation. The 
only conceivable opening for the regulation of tobacco products emerged in the cat-
egory of drugs, which the FDCA defined as "articles intended for use in the diagnosis, 
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease,"168 and "articles (other than food) 
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body." 169 
The need to establish "intent," however, proved to be a stumbling block, as the 
courts ruled that the requisite intent was not that of the consumer, but that of the 
manufacturer. 170 Hence, only when the government could prove that the manufacturer 
meant for his product to prevent a disease or affect a bodily function could enforce-
ment action be taken in the case of a tobacco product. 171 This occurred only twice in 
reported cases, when a manufacturer claimed that its cigarettes were useful in prevent-
ing a range of illnesses, 172 and when a cigarette manufacturer made weight-reduction 
claims for his products. 173 Moreover, in an earlier decision setting aside an order of 
FTC seeking to prohibit the claim that a cigarette was less irritating to the nose and 
throat, a court had held that the definition of "drug" in the FTC Act, which was iden-
tical to the definition in the FDCA, did not encompass a substance that was intended 
merely to come into contact with the senses and soothe them. 174 
Indeed, FDA took the position that in the absence of such express claims, ciga-
rettes could not be regulated as drugs. 175 This interpretation withstood a judicial chal-
lenge in 1980, when a consumer group petitioned the agency to assert jurisdiction 
over cigarettes as both drugs and devices. In ASH v. Harris, 176 the petitioners argued 
that a substance might qualify as a drug if consumers used it to affect the structure or 
any function of the body. The court agreed that consumer use might be used to estab-
lish the intent of a seller, but only if the near-exclusive use of the product was for the 
purpose of affecting the structure or function of the body; in such a case, FDA might 
infer the requisite statutory intent from the way virtually all consumers were using the 
product and from the manufacturer's presumed knowledge of this level ofuse. 177 Peti-
tioners, however, had not introduced any evidence of consumer intent, and hence the 
court upheld FDA's denial of the petition on the ground that it failed to establish that 
cigarettes were drugs. 
poured, sprinkled, or sprayed on, introduced into, or otherwise applied to the human body or any part thereof 
for cleansing, beautifYing, promoting attractiveness, or altering the appearance, and (2) articles intended for 
use as a component of any such articles, except that such term shall not include soap"). 
167 Jd. § 321(h) (FDCA § 201(h)) (covering instruments, apparatus, and contrivances intended for uses 
such as would qualifY an article as a "drug" under 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(2), (3)). 
168 Jd. § 321(g)(I)(B) (FDCA § 201(g)(1)(8)). 
169 Jd. § 32l(g)(I)(C) (FDCA § 201(g)(l)(C)). 
170 See I JAMES T. O'REILLY, FooD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION§ 13.03 (1979). 
171 It is ironic that Jean Nicot, the Frenchman for whom nicotine was named, helped popularize the 
smoking of tobacco in the mid-sixteenth century by extolling its curative powers. See FRITCHLER, supra note 
19, at 5-6; KLUGER, supra note 14, at 9. 
172 See United States v. 46 Cartons More or Less, Containing Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 
1953). 
173 See United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 
1959). 
174 See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Liggett& Myers Tobacco Co., 108 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd, 
203 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1953). 
175 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1454 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, 92d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 239 (1972) (statement of Commissioner of Food and Drugs). 
176 655 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
177 In other words, a manufacturer, knowing that almost every consumer of his product was using it in a 
certain way, could be considered to intend such a use ifhe continued to market the product with knowledge of 
the way it was being used. 
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The statutory definition of"drug" presents a third possibility, inclusion in the United 
States Pharmacopoeia, the Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or the 
National Formulary. 118 Nicotine is listed as a drug in the first of these compendia. 179 
Mere listing in a nongovernmental publication, however, has been held not to qualify a 
substance as a drug, because to do so would amount to an unlawful delegation oflegis-
lative authority to a private organization. 180 
3. Tobacco and Other Consumer Safety Statutes 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted a number of bills intended to protect 
consumers from the risks of physical injury and illness. In several of these statutes, 
however, the drafters specifically excluded from coverage tobacco and tobacco prod-
ucts. Thus, in the Consumer Product Safety Act, which creates broad authority to ban 
hazardous products and set consumer product safety standards, 181 the definition of"con-
sumer product" specifies that tobacco and tobacco products are not covered. 182 An 
amendment to the Hazardous Substances Labeling Act of 1960183 exempted tobacco 
and tobacco products from the definition of"hazardous substances." 184 The Controlled 
Substances Act of 1970 exempted tobacco from its definition of"controlled substance."185 
Even statutes seeking to protect consumers' wallets and pocketbooks omitted tobacco 
products. 186 
4. Tobacco and FTC 
In 1938 Congress gave FTC explicit authority to combat "deceptive acts or prac-
tices in commerce."187 This language made it clear that FTC could take action against 
false advertising that deceived the consuming public. 188 In addition, FTC received addi-
tional procedural weapons and sanctions to deal with deceptive advertisements for food, 
drugs, medical devices, and cosmetics,189 statutorily defined in language identical to 
that found in the FDCA. 190 
178 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(l)(a) (FDCA § 201(g)(l)(a)). 
179 See I USP DISPENSING INFORMATION, DRUG INFORMATION FOR THE HEALTH CARE PRACTITIONER 2138 
(1997). 
180 United States v. An Article of Drug ... Ova II, 414 F. Supp. 660 (D.N.J. 1975), aff'd without 
opinion, 535 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1976). The court went on to make a not-altogether persuasive attempt to 
salvage some permissible meaning out of§ 321(g)(J)(A). The shakiness of this prong of the "drug" defini-
tion probably persuaded FDA not to rely on it, even as an alternative ground, when the agency finally 
decided to regulate nicotine as a drug. See infra part III (C) (2). 
181 On the Consumer Product Safety Act, see generally MICHAEL R. LEMOV, CoNSUMER PRoDUCT SAFETY 
COMMISSSION (1983); WILLIAM KIMBLE, FEDERAL CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT (1975). 
182 Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207, 1208 (1972) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(l)(B)). 
183 Pub. L. No. 86-613, 74 Stat. 372 (1960) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(2)). 
184 Consumer Product Safety Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-284, 90 Stat. 503 (1976). 
185 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). This creates an interesting anomaly. Despite the recognized addictiveness of 
cigarettes, they are exempted from regulation under the Controlled Substances Act; a tobacco-dependence 
treatment medication containing nicotine, however, conceivably might be regulated under the Act. See 
supra part II (B) (7) (b). 
186 See, e.g., Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 89-755,80 Stat. 1296, 1301 (1966) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 1459(a)(l)) (tobacco products excluded from coverage). 
187 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l). 
188 In 1931, the U.S. Supreme Court held that FTC could take action against false advertising only if it 
adversely affected competition. FTC v. Raladam, 283 U.S. 643, 649 (1931). The Wheeler-Lea Amendments 
subsequently made it clear that the Commission could protect the consuming public against deceptive 
advertisements. See Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. at Ill. 
189 15 U.S.C. § 55(b)-(e). 
190 !d.§§ 321(f), (g)(1), (h), (i) (FDCA §§ 201(f), (g)(1), (h), (i)). 
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Thus, although the Commission could not use this latter authority to police the 
advertising of cigarettes, which were not considered drugs at the time, it could use its 
general authority against misleading promotion by the tobacco industry. In 1942, FTC 
issued its first complaint against a cigarette manufacturer for deceptive advertising, 
based on unsubstantiated health claims. 191 
It was not until 1964, however, after the Surgeon General issued a report noting the 
scientific verification of a causal link between smoking and lung cancer, 192 that the 
Commission began an administrative proceeding to issue rules governing the advertis-
ing and labeling of cigarettes. 193 At this point Congress intervened. 
5. Tobacco and Congress 
In 1965 Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 194 
which declared as its purpose the creation of a comprehensive federal program to regu-
late the labeling and advertising of cigarettes as a response to the health risks posed by 
smoking. 195 The new law mandated a health warning to appear on cigarette packages 
and advertising. 196 It also provided that no other warning could be required on the pack-
ages or in the advertising of cigarettes. 197 Finally, it directed FTC to report annually to 
Congress about the effectiveness of the required labeling and about current cigarette 
promotion practices, 198 and FDA to make annual reports about the health consequences 
of smoking. 199 The new law cut short FTC's effort to require health warnings in adver-
tising, and gave the industry a strong defense to assert in product-liability cases- the 
assumption of known risks by smokers.200 
Four years later, Congress passed the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, which 
strengthened the warning label requirements and banned cigarette advertising on radio 
and television. 201 Congress intervened in 1973 to include little cigars within the cover-
age of the 1969 Act, 202 and yet again in 1986 with the passage of the Comprehensive 
Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act, which placed similar restrictions on the la-
beling and advertising of smokeless tobacco. 203 
191 See KLUGER, supra note 14, at 130. 
192 See DEP'T OF HEALTII, EDUC., & WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., SMOKING AND HEALTH REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (Pub. No. )) 03) ( 1964). 
193 See 29 Fed. Reg. 530 (Jan. 22, 1964). 
194 Pub. L. No. 89-72,79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341). 
19
' 15 u.s.c. § 1331. 
196 /d. § 1333(a). 
197 !d. § 1334. 
198 /d. § 1337(a). 
199 /d. § 1337(b). 
200 See Elizabeth Brenner Drew, The Quiet Victory of the Cigarette Lobby: How It Found the Best 
Filter Yet- Congress, ATLANTIC MoNTHLY, Sept. 1965, at 76. 
201 Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340). This statute pre-
empted an initiative of the Federal Communications Commission, which first required broadcasters to give 
equal time for antismoking commercials and then proposed to ban all television advertising for tobacco 
products. See KLUGER, supra note 14, at 303-08, 327-28. The ban on television advertising also would put 
an end to the broadcast industry's need to provide time for antismoking advertisements, which apparently 
were having some effect on smokers. See Robert A. Kegan & David Vogel, The Politics of Smoking Regu-
lation: Canada, France, and the United States, in SMOKING PoLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CuLTURE, supra note 
19, at 22, 35. 
202 Little Cigar Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-109, 87 Stat. 352 (1973). 
203 Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408). 
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6. An Overview of Cigarette Regulation in 1996 
On the eve ofFDA's promulgation of new rules governing cigarettes, the labeling 
and electronic advertising of cigarettes and little cigars was subject to the require-
ments and limitations spelled out in the 1969 Act, while the 1986 Act covered smoke-
Jess tobacco. Moreover, if cigarette companies made labeling claims to the effect that 
their products might prevent disease or affect a bodily function, the rules relating to 
the marketing of new drugs might apply. 
As long as a manufacturer complied with the 1969 and 1986 Acts, and refrained 
from making assertions that would bring his product within the definition of a drug, 
he could continue to market cigarettes, little cigars, or smokeless tobacco (or make 
alterations in their composition) without concern for the impact of federal regulation. 
This situation changed in the mid-1990s, when disclosures based on internal docu-
ments from the tobacco industry revealed that the companies had long been manipu-
lating nicotine levels in their products. 204 
C. Regulation of Tobacco Products After 1996 
1. In General 
On August 28, 1996, FDA promulgated a set of regulations that marked a sharp 
departure from the hands-off policy the agency traditionally had followed in matters 
involving cigarettes and other tobacco products. 205 The new approach classified nico-
tine as a drug206 and cigarettes as medical devices.207 As a consequence ofthis reclas-
sification, the agency imposed distribution controls on the sale of cigarettes and smoke-
less tobacco to keep them away from children.208 The rule also provided that the 
labels of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products bear the established names of the 
products and a statement of intended use. 209 
2. Nicotine as a Drug 
The 1996 regulation took the position that nicotine affects the structure or func-
tion of the human body by causing not only addiction and other psychoactive effects, 
but also by controlling weight. 210 The more difficult legal hurdle for FDA to surmount, 
however, was to establish that the manufacturers of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco 
intended these effects. The regulation sought to do this by producing evidence that 
the addictive and other pharmacological effects of nicotine are so widely known, and 
the public's consumption of cigarettes to achieve these effects is so widespread, 
204 The story is told in PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKE SCREEN: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY COVER-
UP ch. 4 (1996); see also KLUGER, supra note 14, at 740-47. For an explanation by the FDA officials 
involved, see David A. Kessler et al., The Food and Drug Administrations Regulation of Tobacco Prod-
ucts, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 988 (1996). 
205 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to 
Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (Aug. 28, 1996). 
206 See Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products Are Nicotine 
Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 44,619, 44,664-45,204 (Aug. 28, 1996). 
207 See id. at 45,205-18. 
20~ See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,616-18. 
209 See id. at 44,617. 
210 See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,631-32. 
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that manufacturers must have intended to market them for these purposes. In addition, 
manufacturers actually and consciously design cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to pro-
vide consumers with a pharmacologically-active dose of nicotine. 211 
FDA confronted its own prior and oft-repeated insistence that cigarettes are 
definitionally not drugs by asserting that the agency had new evidence, unavailable in 
the past, to support the new position being taken.212 
3. Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products as Medical Devices 
If the new rules merely had classified nicotine as a drug and had gone no further, 
FDA's authority to regulate cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products would have been 
somewhat restricted. Given the addictive quality of nicotine, the substance hardly could 
qualify as being generally recognized as safe by qualified experts, and therefore it would 
fall within the definition of"new drug."213 Under this scenario, the agency's only op-
tion, if it wished to take action, would be to remove the products from the market on the 
ground that they were unapproved new drugs, a radical move that would have enor-
mous economic, political, and social implications. 
Therefore, the agency chose a more flexible regulatory approach.214 The Medical 
Device Amendments of 1976 had given FDA a range of statutory mechanisms to deal 
with problems associated with the marketing of medical devices, and these went con-
siderably beyond the agency's authority to regulate drugs.215 The availability of these 
mechanisms persuaded FDA to place into the device category those components of 
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco that delivered nicotine into the human body, and to 
view cigarettes and smokeless tobacco together as combination "drug-device" prod-
ucts. 
The statutory definition of"device" encompasses an "instrument, ... contrivance . 
. . or similar article ... intended to affect the structure or any function of the body."216 
Hence, those parts of a cigarette or smokeless tobacco that made possible the entry of 
nicotine into the human body would be "devices," because they were intended to affect 
a bodily function. 217 
The device definition went on to exclude a contrivance that "achieve[ d] its primary 
intended purpose through chemical action within ... the body."218 FDA took the posi-
tion that the device components of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco did not achieve 
their primary intended purpose as a result of chemical action; it was nicotine, the drug 
component, that had a chemical effect.219 
Because the FDCA expressly recognized the possibility of combination drug-de-
vice products,22° FDA put cigarettes and smokeless tobacco within that category, and 
211 See id. at 44,632-48. 
212 See id. at 44,650-53. 
213 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (FDCA § 20J(p)). 
214 See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,404. FDA insisted, however that it "could have used its drug authorities to 
implement similar types of controls on cigarettes and smokeless tobacco as it is imposing under the some-
what more flexible device authorities." ld. 
215 On FDA's authority to regulate medical devices, see generally Howard M. Holstein & Edward C. 
Wilson, Developments in Medical Device Regulation, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 59, at 257. 
216 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (FDCA § 201(h)). 
217 FDA established the requisite intent by using the same evidence and reasoning employed to support 
the conclusion that nicotine is a drug. See supra part II (B) (I). 
218 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (FDCA § 201(h)). 
219 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,649-50. 
220 See 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(l) (FDCA § 503(g)(J)); see also Nancy L. Buc & Kate C. Beardsley, 
Combination Products and Other Jurisdictional Conundrums, in 2 FuNDAMENTALS, supra note 59, at 251. 
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went on to assert that it had the authority to decide which of the regulatory mecha-
nisms applicable to drugs and devices would be invoked in this particular set of regu-
lations. 221 
4. Restrictions on Sale and Distribution 
The 1996 regulations classify cigarettes and smokeless tobacco as "restricted 
devices," a category analogous to the prescription-only status applicable to certain 
drugs.222 The FDCA gives FDA authority to place restrictions on the sale, distribu-
tion, or use of a medical device "if, because of its potentiality for harmful effect or the 
collateral measures necessary to its use, [FDA] determines that there cannot other-
wise be reasonable assurance of its safety and effectiveness."223 If the agency makes 
such a finding, it may require that the device be sold or distributed by prescription 
only, or "upon such other conditions as [FDA] may prescribe."224 
On the basis of its reading of this statutory language, FDA placed various restric-
tions on the advertising and promotion of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, and ac-
cess to these products by minors,225 and issued requirements that certain information 
appear on packages, cartons, and boxes containing tobacco products.226 
5. Labeling Requirements 
Utilizing its authority to take action against devices whose labels did not bear 
their established name, 227 FDA required that the name of the product appear on the 
labels of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products, and listed eight specific names 
for those products, ranging from cigarettes and cigarette tobacco to plug chewing 
tobacco and snuff. 228 In addition, the label would have to bear the following statement 
of intended use: "Nicotine Delivery Device for Persons 18 or Older."229 
6. Judicial Review of FDA Regulations 
The industry mounted a legal challenge to the 1996 regulations, and a year later 
a U.S. District Court in North Carolina upheld most of them.230 The court found 
FDA's position (that a manufacturer's representations were not the only source for 
determining whether a product was intended to affect a bodily function) to be a per-
missible interpretation of the FDCA;231 both the way a product foreseeably might be 
221 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,649-50. 
222 See supra part II (B) (7) (c). 
223 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e)(I) (FDCA § 520(e)(I)). 
224 !d. § 360j(e)(I)(B) (FDCA § 520(e)(I)(B)). 
m 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,426-62, 44,465-538. 
226 !d. at 44,462-65. 
227 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (FDCA § 502(a)). 
228 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,617. 
229 /d. Authority for this requirement stems from 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e)(2), which provides that the label 
of a restricted device describe restrictions that have been placed on the device under 21 U.S.C. § 360j(l). 
The latter section provided FDA with a legal basis for placing restrictions on the distribution of cigarettes 
and smokeless tobacco products. See supra part Ill (C) (4). 
23° Coyne Beahm, Inc., 958 F. Supp. at 1060. 
231 The court relied on Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), which held that where a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a particular issue, an interpre-
tation by the agency charged with administering the statute must be upheld if it is based on a permissible 
construction of the statutory language. 
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used and the way consumers actually use it provide objective evidence from which a 
manufacturer's intended use might be inferred. The court concluded that FDA had 
made an adequate finding of intended use on the basis of foreseeability and actual 
consumer use. 
The court, however, went on to state that evidence of a manufacturer's subjective 
intent - in this case internal industry documents tending to show that the manufac-
turers actually meant for their products to affect a bodily function - would not be 
relevant to establish intended use, because FDA's own regulations232 limited proof of 
intended use to evidence of objective intent (intent delineated by objective manifes-
tations). 233 
The one portion of the regulation invalidated by the court was the attempt to 
place restrictions on the promotion and advertising of tobacco products. The court 
refused to give the agency the authority to restrict "sale, distribution, or use"234 or to 
apply the broad readings FDA had assigned to the phrase "such other conditions."235 
The agency's argument was that restrictions on promotion and advertising were "other 
conditions" it might lawfully place on the "sale" of restricted devices. The court in-
sisted that the term "other conditions" had to be construed within its context, which 
permitted FDA to put restricted devices on prescription-only status and impose simi-
lar controls on the way the devices were distributed. In addition, the court noted that 
other parts of the FDCA gave FDA limited power to regulate the advertising of re-
stricted devices,236 and concluded from this that Congress did not intend to give the 
agency similar but unlimited authority under the section authorizing distribution con-
trols. This holding obviated the need for the court to address the plaintiffs' argument 
that the restrictions placed by the regulations upon the advertising of cigarettes vio-
lated the tobacco companies' constitutionally protected right of free speech. 237 
The restrictions on access to cigarettes and smokeless tobacco by children and 
adolescents, however, survived the court's scrutiny, because they could be found 
reasonably to fall within the term "other conditions." The court also upheld FDA's 
authority to require the labeling of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to bear the 
product's established name and intended use, as required by the agency's regulations. 
7. Further Action FDA Might Take Under the 1996 Regulations 
FDA limited the thrust of its 1996 regulations to restrictions that would protect 
children and adolescents from the addictive power of certain tobacco products.238 The 
agency insisted, however, that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco could be subject to the 
232 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.128, 801.4. 
233 The internal documents might have some relevance to the finding of foreseeability, because if a 
manufacturer intends for a product to be used in a certain way, he surely could anticipate it would be used 
in that way. 
234 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e)(l) (FDCA § 520(e)(l)). 
235 /d.§ 360j(e)(I)(B) (FDCA § 520(e)(I)(B)). 
236 See id. § 352(q)-(r) (FDCA § 502(q)-(r)). 
237 For arguments that a ban on content-based restrictions on tobacco advertising would be unconstitu-
tional, see Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589 (1996); 
see also Daniel Helberg, Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA s Proposed Restrictions on Cigarette Advertis-
ing Under the Commercial-Speech Doctrine, 29 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1219 (1996) (student note criticizing 
FDA's attempt to restrict advertising of cigarettes). For defenses of FDA's proposed restrictions on advertis-
ing, see Allison M. Zieve, The FDA s Regulation of Tobacco Products, 51 Fooo & DRUG L.J. 495,498-99 
(1996); Lawrence 0. Goslin, PeterS. Arno & Allan M. Brandt, Free Speech Smokescreen, WASH. PosT, 
Mar. 3, 1997, at A23. 
23
' For FDA's explanation why it focused on the protection of minors, see 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,398-99. 
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entire range of regulatory controls applicable to medical devices,239 and expressly left 
open the possibility of future actions, such as the invocation of provisions of the FDCA 
that include prohibitions on adulteration240 and misbranding;241 the imposition of cer-
tain requirements that govern labeling, 242 recordkeeping and reporting, 243 and premarket 
notification;244 and the insertion of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products into one 
of three classes, which would trigger additional regulatory burdens.245 
Under the last of these options, FDA might classify cigarettes and smokeless to-
bacco products as Class II medical devices, and set performance standards for them. 
This might result in the imposition of onerous controls on manufacturers, but it also 
would place a considerable strain on the agency's resources. 246 
A Class II medical device is one for which general controls would not be sufficient 
to ensure safety and effectiveness.247 The specific controls that FDA is authorized to 
impose on Class II devices include performance standards,248 which are nowhere de-
fined in the FDCA.249 The House report on the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 
states a preference for result-oriented standards permitting manufacturers to use tech-
nological alternatives to achieve desired results, which suggests the setting of perfor-
mance requirements, but the report adds that design-related standards also may be pro-
mulgated. 250 The Senate report, on the other hand, indicates that "standards must relate 
to the safety or effectiveness (including reliability over time) of the device or other 
'performance' characteristics."251 The conference report sheds no further light on what 
Congress meant by performance standards.252 
Under a result-oriented reading of the term "performance standards," FDA might 
specify the maximum amounts of particular ingredients a cigarette or smokeless to-
bacco product might deliver to the consumer, and leave it to manufacturers to design 
filters or other mechanisms to keep these ingredients at the designated level when ab-
sorbed into the body. This would seem to be a permissible reading of the statutory 
language. 
The FDCA, moreover, may expressly permit performance standards that go be-
yond the designation of results; it states that standards may include "provisions re-
specting the ... ingredients ... of the device."253 This opens the possibility of regulat-
ing what ingredients might, or might not, be used in cigarettes and smokeless tobacco 
products. 
239 See id. at 44,404. 
240 21 U.S.C. § 351 (FDCA § 501). 
241 !d. § 352 (FDCA § 502). 
242 E.g., id. § 352(s) (FDCA §502(s)) (device misbranded if it is subject to a performance standard that 
requires specific labeling and it fails to bear such labeling). 
243 !d. § 3601 (FDCA § 519). 
244 !d. § 360(k) (FDCA § 51 O(k)). 
245 For a discussion of these burdens, see supra part II (C). 
246 Cf James T. O'Reilly, A Consistent Ethic of Safety Regulation: The Case for Improving Regulation 
of Tobacco Products, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 215, 234-35 (1989) (resource drain as reason why FDA has hesitated to 
do battle with powerful tobacco industry). 
247 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(I)(B) (FDCA § 513(a)(I)(B)). 
248 See id. § 360d (FDCA § 514). 
249 Cf 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a)(l) (standards promulgated under the Consumer Product Safety Act are to 
be "expressed in terms of performance requirements"). 
250 See H. REP. No. 94-853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1976). A design standard dictates how a desired 
result must be achieved. 
251 S. REP. No. 94-33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. II (1975). 
252 See H. REP. No. 94-1090, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
253 21 U.S.C. § 360d(a)(2)(B)(i) (FDCA § 514(a)(2)(B)(i)). 
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Once a decision has been made to set performance standards, FDA would have 
to follow a number of procedural requirements in order to put a device into Class 
II.254 Having placed a device in Class II, the agency would have to follow an even 
more cumbersome set of procedures to finalize performance standards. 255 The proce-
dural barriers to be overcome in promulgating performance standards, even though 
they have been somewhat simplified, explain why FDA has finalized very few of 
them. 256 Hence, reliance on performance standards to regulate cigarettes and smoke-
less tobacco products seems an unlikely regulatory option, at least under the statutory 
authority as it currently stands. 
Another option would be for FDA to regulate cigarettes and smokeless tobacco 
products as Class III medical devices.257 The agency first would have to follow the 
same type of classification procedures as are required for Class II. 258 Next, the agency 
would have to promulgate regulations requiring premarket approvai.259 The manufac-
turers whose devices are covered by the regulation would then have to apply to FDA 
for premarket approval.260 The FDCA directs FDA to deny an application on a find-
ing of insufficient evidence demonstrating a "reasonable assurance" of safety and 
efficacy. 261 
Given the risks known to be associated with cigarettes and smokeless tobacco 
products, it is difficult to see how the agency could reasonably be assured of the 
safety of these products. Thus, regulating them as Class III medical devices would 
involve the same sort of inflexibility that would attach to regulating them as new 
drugs. 262 This, plus the burdensome procedures FDA would have to follow, cut heavily 
against the Class III option. 
FDA might use its existing authority to go beyond the 1996 regulations, a move 
that has been urged in a petition submitted to the agency by the American Lung Asso-
ciation and other interested groups.263 Such an initiative might classify other tobacco 
products, like full-length cigars, as drug-device combinations, and might seek to de-
crease the incidence of smoking and smoking-related diseases among the general 
population, rather than target only children and adolescents. 
IV. THE REGULATION OF RISK-REDUCTION SMOKING OR SMOKELESS 
TOBACCO PRODUCTS 
A. In General 
An important unresolved issue the American Lung Association petition asked 
FDA to address is how the agency should regulate the manufacture and marketing of 
254 For example, FDA first would need to secure the recommendation of an expert paneL/d.§ 360c(b) 
(FDCA § 513(b)). 
m The procedures are detailed in 21 U.S.C. § 360(d) (FDCA § 513(d)). One commentator has de-
scribed the procedures as "a procedural maze." Robert B. Letlar, Public Accountability and Medical Device 
Regulation, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECJI. I, 25 (1989). For a diagram of the standard-setting process, see id. at 26. 
2
'
6 See Holstein & Wilson, supra note 144, at 295. 
m See id. at 273-84; Leflar, supra note 255, at 9-24. 
2
'
8 See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(b) (FDCA § 513(b)). 
2
'
9 See id. § 360e(b) (FDCA § 515(b)). 
260 See id. § 360e(c) (FDCA § 515(c)). 
261 See id. § 360e(d)(2)(A)-(B) (FDCA § 515(d)(2)(A)-(B)). 
262 See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text. 
263 FDA Dkt. No. 98-P-0031 (Jan. 15, 1998). 
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cigarettes that expressly or impliedly purport to reduce risks associated with smok-
ing.264 This would be the type of product the hypothetical Company C wants to sell. It 
would provide consumers with the taste and smell of a traditional smoking product, but 
at the same time it would contain reduced tar or nicotine levels, or other physical quali-
ties, that would lessen the level of danger posed by other tobacco products. As such, the 
new item would share characteristics of the products Companies A and B want to intro-
duce. 
B. FDA s Prior Responses to Risk-Reduction Cigarettes 
The cigarette industry has had a long history of bringing to market smoking prod-
ucts with designs (such as filters) and content (such as lower tar levels) that appar-
ently mitigated some of the adverse effects associated with smoking.265 FDA did not 
seek to classify such cigarettes as drugs, perhaps because the agency concluded that 
the claims made for them did not, with sufficient specificity, promise the prevention 
of disease. 
In the late 1980s, the tobacco industry began to experiment with "smokeless" 
cigarettes that burned substances other than tobacco. 266 At this point, an antismoking 
group petitioned FDA to regulate both these new products and all low-tar cigarettes 
as drugs, on the ground that they clearly were intended to prevent disease.267 The 
agency temporized, and the petition found itself relegated to the backbumer when 
FDA began its initiative to regulate all cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products as 
drug-device combinations. 
C. FDA s Current Options Regarding Risk-Reduction Cigarettes 
1. Risk-Reduction Cigarettes as Covered by the 1996 Regulations 
If FDA decided to react to Company C's planned introduction of a risk-reduction 
cigarette, the first issue to be confronted would be whether the new product fell within 
the scope ofthe 1996 regulations. If the cigarette contained no ingredient, such as nico-
tine, that might addict users, then Company C hardly could be found to have intended 
the product to affect a bodily function, and therefore it could not be swept into the 
category of a drug-device combination under the approach utilized to regulate ciga-
rettes and smokeless tobacco. 268 If the new product had lower levels of nicotine than 
ordinary cigarettes, the agency would have to determine how addictive the product 
might be, and whether the level of addiction was strong enough to warrant government 
intervention, under the parameters of the 1996 regulations, on behalf of smokers unable 
to free themselves from dependence on the product. In addition, FDA would have to 
establish that Company C intended that its product affect a bodily function. If Company 
C were new to the cigarette business, the agency would have a difficult burden to estab-
lish intent on the basis of foreseeability or actual consumer use. 269 
264 ld. at 27-28. 
265 For a description, see KLuGER, supra note 14, at ch. 6; John Slade, Tobacco Product Regulation: 
Context and Issues, 53 Fooo & DRUG L.J. 43 (Supp. 1998). 
266 For a description of some of these products, see Slade, supra note 265, at 56. 
267 See HILTS, supra note 204, at 109; Carchman, supra note 157, at 98. 
268 See supra part Ill (C) (2). 
269 See supra part Ill (C) (5). 
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A finding that the characteristics of Company C's new cigarette were sufficiently 
close to those of traditional cigarettes to render them subject to the 1996 regulations 
would mean, at this point in time, only that certain requirements with respect to labeling 
and distribution would apply to the new product. These requirements, however, were 
designed to reduce risks associated with cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, and would 
seem ill-suited to a product whose unique characteristic was risk reduction. 
2. Risk-Reduction Cigarettes Regulated as Disease-Treatment 
Products 
Whether or not FDA could classify risk -reduction cigarettes as drug-device combi-
nations subject to the 1996 regulations, the agency also might consider whether to treat 
them like any other tobacco-dependence treatment medication. Since the purpose of 
Company C's new product would seem to be identical to that of the type of product 
Company B seeks to market, it would appear logical that both products be subject to the 
same kind and degree of regulation. Before regulating Company C's product as a drug, 
however, FDA would have to determine whether it fell within the parameters of the 
"drug" definition. 
A new smoking product marketed with the claim that it could free smokers from 
nicotine addiction would fall within the drug category for the same reasons that to-
bacco-dependence treatment medications are classified as drugs.270 1t also might be con-
sidered a medical device designed to deliver whatever substance brought to fruition the 
claim that the product could free the user from tobacco dependence. 271 Thus, FDA might 
treat Company C's product as a drug-device combination. 
But suppose Company C merely makes a claim that its new cigarette had low levels 
of tar and nicotine. FDA has never taken the position that this type of claim alone would 
justify classifying the product as a drug. 272 Because the agency has never previously 
taken the position that such claims are not disease-related and therefore would not bring 
a product within the drug category, however, the agency might now ponder the possibil-
ity of regulating such products as drugs on the basis of the claim. 
A conceptual hurdle that would confront the agency derives from the fact that a 
"low-tar-and-low-nicotine" claim might mean only that Company C's new cigarettes 
are less risky than cigarettes with higher levels of tar and nicotine. The mere assertion 
that a product is less apt to cause harm than competing products may not be enough to 
bring the product within the ambit of the "drug" definition. Labeling milk as pasteur-
ized might imply that the product was safer than nonpasteurized milk, but this would 
not make pasteurized milk a drug.273 
On the other hand, the claim might be interpreted to mean that Company C's new 
product could help smokers free themselves from existing dependence on tradition-
ally formulated smoking products. If Company C could foresee that this is how con-
sumers would use the product, this might be enough to fit it within the "drug" defini-
270 See supra part II (B) (I). 
271 See supra part Ill (C) (3). 
272 See supra part IV (B). 
273 In the 1950s, food labeling began to bear implied health-related claims to the effect that a particular 
product was low in fat or cholesterol. When FDA doubted the truth of the assertion, the agency took the 
position that such claims rendered the food misbranded. See Peter B. Hutt, Government Regulation of 
Health Claims in Food Labeling and Advertising, 41 Fooo DRuG CosM. L.J. 3, 27-34 (1986). FDA, how-
ever, could not take the same approach toward "low-tar-and-low-nicotine" cigarettes without first establish-
ing jurisdiction over the products. 
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tion.274 
FDA might classify Company C's product as a new drug because there would be no 
general recognition of its efficacy. 275 The agency then could condition the marketing of 
the product upon the issuance of an approved NDA, just as it would require an NDA for 
Company B's new tobacco-dependence treatment medication.276 
3. Risk-Reduction Cigarettes Regulated as Devices 
An alternative approach FDA might consider is similar to that taken in the 1996 
regulations. The agency might classify "low-tar-and-low-nicotine" cigarettes as drug-
device combinations, and might utilize its administrative discretion in not calling for 
Company C to submit safety and effectiveness data as part of an NDA; instead, FDA 
might resort to the more flexible regulatory authority it has over medical devices to 
classify risk-reduction cigarettes as Class II medical devices and set performance stan-
dards for them. 277 
Not to subject Company C to the full panoply of rules relating to new drugs would 
foster inconsistencies in the regulation of risk-reduction cigarettes and tobacco-depen-
dence treatment products, which in turn would create economic disincentives for the 
development of the latter. 278 On the other hand, to require manufacturers wanting to 
market low-tar-and-low-nicotine cigarettes to go through the new drug approval pro-
cess would create economic disincentives for the development of such products. The 
setting of performance standards might be an appropriate middle ground. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
The social problems attributable to tobacco require steps that will prevent addic-
tion to nicotine by developing ways to discourage people from smoking (perhaps by a 
combination of "command-and-control" government intervention and public educa-
tion), help those already addicted to break the chains that bind them, and deal with the 
issue of how to pay for the economic costs tobacco products have exacted on society. 
This article has dealt with the government regulation of tobacco products, an initia-
tive that seeks to prevent or reduce tobacco-related harm, and the government regula-
tion of tobacco-dependence treatment products, an effort that seeks to reduce the social 
and economic costs of tobacco consumption. It has demonstrated that Company A, in 
bringing to market a new tobacco product, will face regulatory requirements that differ 
markedly from those imposed on Company B in its preparation for the introduction of 
a new product intended to treat tobacco dependence, and from those imposed on Com-
pany C, which seeks to market a risk-reduction tobacco product. 
Company C is competing with Company A. It wants to offer smokers an alterna-
tive that would provide them with the satisfaction they derive from smoking but at a 
reduced level of risk. It would not seem reasonable to permit the playing field to tilt in 
favor of the more hazardous product. Indeed, the opposite would be more consistent 
with sound public health policy. 
274 For a discussion of how foreseeability might establish intended use, see supra part III (C) (5). 
275 For a discussion of tobacco-dependence treatment medications as new drugs, see supra part II (B) (3). 
276 For a discussion of the new drug approval process, see supra part II (B) ( 4). 
277 For a discussion of the difficulties that might arise from a decision to set performance standards, 
see supra part II (A) (7). 
m For elaboration of this point, see Henningfield, supra note 24, at 92. 
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Company C also is competing with Company B, in that it is appealing to smokers 
concerned with freeing themselves from dependence on nicotine, or otherwise lessen-
ing the dangers associated with smoking. 279 Consumers use Company B 's smoking-
cessation product for the exact same reason they would use Company C's low-tar-and-
low-nicotine cigarette, to reduce their intake of nicotine while still holding their addic-
tion at bay. To force Company B to do clinical testing to support an indication of smok-
ing cessation without requiring similar tests from Company C before it can market a 
cigarette to be marketed for the identical purpose makes little sense. Here, the playing 
field ought to be level. 
The regulatory inconsistencies that have been described in this article might be 
dealt with in one of two ways. The first would be to amend the FDCA to clarify FDA's 
legal authority over tobacco products, and to address any problems peculiar to the regu-
lation of tobacco-dependence treatment products. The so-called "global-settlement" 
legislation now before Congress includes statutory changes as one facet of a total pack-
age that addresses issues of civil liability for tobacco-related harm, the taxation and 
regulation of tobacco products, and the appropriation of funds for smoking-cessation 
programs. 280 
A second approach would be to utilize FDA's existing authority in a manner aimed 
at creatively and comprehensively achieving a broad goal of decreasing the incidence 
of smoking and smoking-related diseases among the general population in the most 
expeditious, effective way possible. Such an ambitious project would weigh heavily on 
FDA's limited resources. The agency already bears vast responsibilities for overseeing 
the integrity of the nation's supply of food and beauty products, and for ensuring the 
safety and effectiveness of drugs and medical devices. The 1996 regulations amounted 
to a modest step with a limited aim; going far beyond them might push FDA into deep, 
uncharted, turbulent waters that the agency might not be prepared to navigate. 
Perhaps a more prudent course of action would be to concentrate on the more 
manageable task of how to regulate reduced-risk cigarettes under the current statutory 
framework, a project on which FDA could utilize its expertise and experience in the 
fields of drug and device regulation. Despite the procedural obstacles they trigger, the 
provisions of the FDCA dealing with Class II medical devices seem to offer the best 
chance of reducing the tilt on the playing field where manufacturers of reduced-risk 
tobacco products and tobacco-dependence medications compete. 
279 See Kenneth E. Warner, John Slade & David T. Sweanor, The Emerging Market for Long-Term 
Nicotine Maintenance, 278 JAMA 1087, 1089 (1997). 
280 Some of the bills that have been introduced in Congress to effectuate the settlement are cited in note 
160, supra. See also S. REP. No. I 05-180, I 05th Con g., 2d Sess. (1998)(report on S. 1415). On a motion to 
close off debate, S. 1415 failed to attract the requisite number (60) of votes. See 144 CoNG. REc. S6479 
(daily ed. June 17, 1998). 
For a provocative criticism of the proposed settlement, see Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs 
of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, I 07 YALE L.J. 1163 ( 1998). 
